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Executive function is traditionally conceptualized as a set of abilities required to guide
behavior toward goals. Here, an integrated theoretical framework for executive function
is developed which has its roots in the notion of hierarchical mental models. Further
following Duncan (2010a,b), executive function is construed as a hierarchical recursive
system of test-operation-test-exit units (Miller et al., 1960). Importantly, it is shown that
this framework can be used to model the main regional prefrontal syndromes, which
are characterized by apathetic, disinhibited and dysexecutive cognition, and behavior,
respectively. Implications of these considerations for the neuropsychological assessment
of executive function are discussed.
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PRELUDE
The neuropsychological assessment of executive function is based
on unsatisfactory experimental methods and clinical materials,
even decades after the pioneering work by Luria (1966). One
of the major difficulties of executive assessment is the paradox
that was smartly described by Lezak (1995): the clinician has to
structure a more or less formal situation “. . . in which patients
can show whether and how well they make structure for them-
selves” (p. 651). Many of the examination techniques (Strauss
et al., 2006) which are thought to be sensitive to executive, or
frontal lobe, disorders (Wood and Grafman, 2003; Miller and
Cummings, 2007; Banich, 2009; Levine and Craig, 2011; Stuss,
2011) clearly allow the subject insufficient room toward self-
induced problem structuring, decision making, and goal setting.
Yet, it is immediately evident that these processes are main com-
ponents of executive behavior, as revealed by Luria’s, Lezak’s,
and many others’ detailed descriptions of behavioral disturbances
after frontal lobe damage.
The need for problem structuring is of particular importance
in situations where executable behavioral and cognitive chunks
are not readily available to the subject, or where their execution
does not proximately lead to the aimed-for goal. Those situations
enforce what Freud had called Probehandeln (mental action sam-
pling) 100 years ago (Freud, 1911). Following Craig (1943), if the
organism carries a mental model of “. . . external reality and its
own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various
alternatives, concludewhich is the best of them, react to future sit-
uations before they arise, utilize the knowledge of the past events
in dealing with the present and the future, and in every day to
react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the
emergencies which face it” (p. 61). Some claims about the struc-
ture, the functionality, and the neuroanatomical distribution of
mental models, including their potential relationships to frontal
lobe damage, are presented below1.
THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF MENTAL MODELS
Here, I develop the idea of hierarchically organizedmental models
which draws heavily on predictive coding theories of the per-
ceptual system (Friston, 2002). Perception is considered as an
active process of inference about underlying states of the world.
Specifically, it is conjectured that perceptual analysis follows fun-
damentally an inversion purpose since it aims at retrieving the
causes, i.e., the parameters of the generative mechanism, from
the effects, i.e., the observed sensory data. In other words, when
observing a sensory phenomenon directed by any parameter θ,
perceptual analysis allows inducing from these observations infer-
ences about θ (Helmholtz, 1867). When the analysis generalizes
over space and time, a prediction of future phenomena of similar
nature becomes available, simply by exploiting the redundancy
within the probability structure of θ (Barlow, 2001).
1The term “mentalmodel” which is used here should not be confused with the
mental model theory which is a theory of reasoning proposing that deduc-
tive and inductive reasoning depend on spatially organized mental models
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). Here, mental models are merely internal representa-
tions of situations that can be derived from something the subject directly
perceives in the environment.
Further, Tolman’s (1948) term of a “cognitive map” signifies a similar concept.
To quote from his famous rejection of behaviorism: “The stimuli, which are
allowed in, are not connected by just simple one-to-one switches to the out-
going responses. Rather, the incoming impulses are usually worked over and
elaborated in the central control room into a tentative, cognitive-like map of
the environment. And it is this tentative map, indicating routes and paths and
environmental relationships, which finally determines what responses, if any,
the animal will finally release” (Tolman, 1948, p. 192).
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Suppose a human observer is exposed to a rapidly chang-
ing environment where multiple states coexist (either sequen-
tially through time or simultaneously through space). When
confronted with this kind of fast-changing environments, the
observer should ideally infer the state probabilities, implying that
he or she represents the probability structure of the environment
hierarchically. In order to do so, he or she needs to learn a state
hyper-parameter τ, and to differentiate between state-specific
parameters (i.e., θ1 and θ2 in the case of two coexisting states;
see Figure 1). The capability to form such hierarchical generative
models of fast-changing environments will greatly enhance the
predictive performance of the observer.
Note that according to this analysis, inference, and prediction
are operations on the same hierarchical data structure. This view
is compatible with predictive coding theories of cortical function
(Friston, 2002). Predictive coding theories posit that the percep-
tual system is structured as hierarchically organized generative
models with increasingly more general nodes (parameters) at
higher levels. Further, predictive coding theories propose that an
internal representation of the world (i.e., the mental model) gen-
erates predictions that are comparedwith stimulus-driven activity
to calculate the residual error between the prediction and the
sensory evidence. The residual error is then used to update the
internal representation of the world so as to minimize the residual
error imposed by future stimuli.
Another implication of this analysis lies in the fact that the
brain remembers the past to predict the future (Bar, 2011). The
close relationship between experience and memory, as stored
in mental models, on one hand and prediction and anticipa-
tion on the other is paralleled by the recently discovered fact
that episodic memory and episodic future thinking share a com-
mon neural substrate in cerebral cortex (Schacter et al., 2008).
This led researchers to ask whether time in the brain is a one-
directional variable, as psychologically experienced, or whether
the brain is actually capable to travel back and forth through time
(Suddendorf et al., 2009).
This analysis portrayed the perceptual system as being
composed of hierarchically organized generative models. In what
follows I will conceptualize executive function, required to guide
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of a hierarchical generative model of observed
sensory data. The inferred probability structure of underlying states of the
world is hierarchically represented, with τ signifying a state
hyper-parameter, θ1 and θ2, denoting dissociable state-specific parameters
(just two levels of the hierarchy are drawn for illustration).
intentional behavior toward goals, as a hierarchically organized
test-retest system, an idea which draws heavily on Miller et al.
(1960). Note that, while the analysis moves from the perceptual
system to the executive system, it retains the idea of hierarchically
organized mental models. Specifically, recursive activation of self-
terminating operating units lies at the core of the suggested model
of executive function.
THE BEHAVIORAL FUNCTIONALITY OF MENTAL MODELS
Frontal lobe damage often disrupts the patient’s capacity for
intentional behavior, it leads in many cases to the appearance
of stimulus-bound behavior and inflexible responding, and it
sometimes limits the ability to initiate behavior at all (Duffy and
Campbell, 2001). The fundamental conjecture of this paper is that
these behavioral syndromes which result from frontal lobe dam-
age may be considered as observable effects of deficient mental
models, as detailed below.
Lashley (1951) had argued long ago that behavior is hier-
archically structured, and Miller et al. (1960) introduced the
“test-operate-test-exit” (TOTE) unit to cognitive psychology just
a few years later. When selected, a TOTE unit would test a partic-
ular environmental state and, if a specified condition was notmet,
would execute a specific operation until the condition became
true. Miller et al. (1960) suggested that all kinds of behavior are
controlled by TOTE units and used the everyday example of ham-
mering a nail. The unit consists of a test-operator [Is the nail
down? (Is the goal state achieved?)], an operation [hammering
(and return to test)], and an exit-operator [to be executed if the
goal state has been achieved (see test-operator)]. Crucially, the
operation of a TOTE unit could be to select another TOTE unit,
allowing for hierarchical structuring based on recursive process-
ing (Corballis, 2011), i.e., by running a series of nested TOTE
units. Details of the idea of recursive activation of self-terminating
operating units are illustrated in Figure 2. Inspection of Figure 2
reveals that mental models may be considered as hierarchical
structures of self-terminating operating units, each capable of
activating otherwise comparable units at sub-ordinate levels of
the hierarchical structure (Botvinick, 2008; Duncan, 2010a,b).
Notice that the multiple-demand system framework (Duncan,
2010a,b) provides partly similar accounts of the crucial features
of internal models guiding sequential behavior in complex sit-
uations. Specifically, both views share the idea of hierarchically
organized internal models (see also Miller et al., 1960). The
view which is presented here is oriented toward the manifold
behavioral disturbances which usually follow frontal lobe lesions
and which were shortly foreshadowed above, whereas Duncan’s
model (Duncan, 2010a,b) is focused more on the neurocognitive
mechanisms of complex problem solving and (fluid) intelligence.
The formation of such recursive mental TOTE models
constitutes the cognitive basis for executive behavior, this
being characterized by the constant occurrence of inten-
tional, goal-directed, and well-organized units of behavior
(Shallice, 1988). The capability to model situations hierarchi-
cally in one’s own mind and to achieve recursively derived
goals of actions is a general purpose mechanism (Duncan,
2010a,b) that can be applied to many seemingly different
situations and with regard to a multitude of input and
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of a recursive mental TOTE model capable of
controlling intentional behavior (just two levels are drawn for
illustration). TOTE units are self-terminating operating units, each capable of
activating otherwise comparable units at sub-ordinate levels of the
hierarchical structure (top-down arrows). The exit-operator of the active TOTE
unit passes control of operations to the super-ordinate TOTE unit (bottom-up
arrows), once the self-terminating condition is reached. Each TOTE unit is
comprises three operators (T, test; O, operation; E, exit). Activated
test-operation-retest loops are running until the actual state matches the goal
state. The exit-operator is executed (i.e., E()) whenever the self-terminating
condition is reached (i.e.,  = 0), so that control of operations is passed to
the super-ordinate unit. Only TOTE units at the lowest level of the hierarchical
structure are capable of activating executable behavioral units, whereas units
at the hyper-planes are solely capable of activating units at sub-ordinate levels
of the hierarchical structure. In this example, a hyper-unit, labeled τ, activates
a unit at the lowest level of the hierarchical structure, labeled θ1, which in turn
activates executable behavioral units (solid arrows). In contrast, the
connections between the un-activated unit θ2 at the lowest level and
executable behavioral units are not active (dashed arrows). Switching
activation states requires executing the exit-operator of unit θ1, once its
self-terminating condition has been reached, i.e., E(θ1) if θ1 = 0, and the
activation of unit θ2 by the hyper-unit τ. By way of this analysis, the current
hypothesis of executive function offers a framework for understanding the
effects of prefrontal lesions on behavioral performance in task switching
paradigms (Robbins, 2007; Shallice et al., 2008; Nyhus and Barceló, 2009;
Kopp and Wessel, 2011).
output modalities. It gives the organism an adaptive advantage,
specifically when confronted with the need to behave appro-
priately in complex and/or fast-changing environments (e.g.,
Behrens et al., 2007; Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011)2.
MENTAL MODELS AND FRONTAL LOBE DAMAGE
Duffy and Campbell (2001) described three distinct prefrontal
syndromes, the apathetic, disinhibited, and dysexecutive types,
each associated with dysfunction in one of the three major pre-
frontal cortical regions (i.e., medial, orbital, and lateral, respec-
tively; see Kouneiher et al., 2009, as well as Rushworth et al., 2011,
for discussion of the behavioral functionality of these prefrontal
regions). As a start, I present a scheme for representing these
2The formation of hierarchically structured recursive mental models, the
abilities to sample mental actions and to predict their environmental conse-
quences in order to select the best alternative for the true course of actions
introduces the teleological idea of final causes into human behavior. To put
it in Ernst Mayr’s words: “Intentional, purposeful human behavior is, almost
by definition, teleological . . .. If teleological means anything, it means goal-
directed . . .. Goal-directed behavior is extremely widespread in the organic
world . . .. The occurrence of goal-directed processes is perhaps the most
characteristic feature of the world of living systems” (E. Mayr; downloaded
3-15-2011 from http://faculty.washington.edu/lynnhank/Mayr3.pdf).
distinct behavioral syndromes of prefrontal dysfunction within
the framework of recursive mental TOTE models.
The medial prefrontal syndrome is easiest to conceptualize.
The common behavioral symptom of apathy, or in the most
severe cases of akinetic mutism, could be viewed as resulting
from a disconnection between otherwise intact recursive mental
TOTE models and executable behavioral units (see Figure 3A).
Consequently, patients with superior medial damage are usu-
ally slower on tasks that require speeded responses, a behavioral
deficit which has been described as a failure of energization, that
is, the process of initiating any response (Stuss, 2011). Since the
structure of the recursive mental TOTE models is left intact, the
failure of energization should present itself as a pure motivational
deficit.
Disinhibited behavior is the cardinal feature of the orbital
prefrontal syndrome which might express itself as increased
distractibility on complex tasks and as environmental depen-
dency in social situations (Lhermitte, 1986; Lhermitte et al.,
1986; see Fellows, 2011, for a more recent conceptualization
of the behavioral functionality of the orbitofrontal cortex). In
essence then, responding by these patients is stimulus-bound
rather than guided by the recursive mental TOTE models
(see Figure 3B). Thus, exogenously activated executable behav-
ioral units may be carried out, without being activated by the
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FIGURE 3 | Analytically lesioned recursive mental TOTE models.
(A) A potential lesion that might underlie the medial syndrome with
predominantly apathetic symptoms. Note that the connections between both
units at the lowest level of the hierarchical structure, θ1 and θ2, and
executable behavioral units are inactive (dashed arrows). (B) A potential
lesion that might underlie the orbital syndrome with predominantly
disorganized symptoms. Note that the connections between both units at
the lowest level of the hierarchical structure, θ1 and θ2, and executable
behavioral units are active (solid arrows). (C) Potential lesions that
might underlie the lateral syndrome with predominantly dysexecutive
symptoms. There are two putative lesion effects: First, they may impair the
functionality of the exit-operators, as detailed in the text. Second, they may
destroy units at any level of the hyper-planes (this is solely adumbrated here
by cancelling topmost arrows). It should be noticed that the various types of
lesion effects are not mutually exclusive. They may occur together in one
patient, in various degrees, depending on the nature, the locus, and
the extension of his or her brain lesion (Duffy and Campbell, 2001; Stuss,
2011).
endogenously structured system for controlling overt actions. By
way of these direct routes from stimuli to actions, the recur-
sive mental TOTE models loose their ability to exert control
over behavior.
The lateral prefrontal syndrome has always been the least
tractable of all prefrontal syndromes, due to the complexities of
the cognitive and behavioral disturbances that are characteristic
for this syndrome. Yet, within the framework which I presented
above, the lateral syndrome starts to loose its chimeric charac-
ter. Figure 3C illustrates the effects that lateral prefrontal lesions
might have on the recursive mental TOTE models. Notice that
primarily transitions from sub-ordinate to super-ordinate levels
of the hierarchy became impossible in the lesioned model. A brief
look back to Figure 2 reveals that these bottom-up transitions are
produced by the exit-operators within the recursive mental TOTE
models. Thus, the hypothesis states simply that lateral prefrontal
lesions impair the exit-operators of the recursive mental TOTE
models.
The impairment of bottom-up transitions might be brought
into being by two dissociable processes. First, lateral prefrontal
lesions might impair the functionality of the exit-operators, ren-
dering them unable to actually produce the required transitions.
Second, lateral prefrontal lesions (Petrides, 2005) and also inferior
medial prefrontal lesions (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004)might impair
state monitoring which is required for the decision whether or not
a specified condition for self-termination has been met as a result
of an elapsed operation of the unit, rendering it unable to actually
self-terminate its activation. Yet, in both cases, the lesioned model
will produce inflexible responding and perseverative behavior, by
leaving the organism unable to switch back and forth between
units of the recursive mental TOTE models (as detailed in the
caption of Figure 2).
Impaired exit-operators and impaired state monitoring render
the behavior of patients with lateral prefrontal lesions persevera-
tive, i.e., they are expected to show a tendency to repeat previous
actions over and over, albeit these are not appropriate any more.
To illustrate let us take the example depicted in Figure 3C. There
are three TOTE units, one at the higher level (τ), representing the
goal state of the problem at hand, and two at the lower (θ1, θ2),
representing subgoals. If τ passed control to θ1 (which, however,
cannot be exited any more, due to the effects of lateral prefrontal
lesions), its assigned behavioral units will be repeatedly executed,
whereas the solution to the problem at hand requires to pass con-
trol first to θ1 and afterwards to θ2, via τ. In other words, these
patients will appear stuck-in-set, unable (a) to flexibly adapt to
actual requirements and (b) to solve problems smoothly. Whereas
patients suffering from impaired exit-operators may be aware of
the inappropriateness of their perseverative tendencies, patients
suffering from impaired state monitoring may be characterized by
a lack of awareness of their perseverative behavior, mainly because
these patients should be generally unable to compare the results
of actions with the intended goals.
However, there remains still another possibility how lateral
prefrontal lesions might impair the functionality of recursive
mental TOTE models. Instead of impairing exit-operators, these
lesions may destroy units at super-ordinate levels of the hier-
archically structured models (as depicted in Figure 3C). An
organism will have difficulty whenever it is confronted with prob-
lems that require contributions of the lesioned units for their
solution. Specifically, eminently novel, complex, and abstract
problems may fall into this range of tasks (Goel, 2010). Apart
from deficient problem solving skills, a general shift from
abstract to more concrete attitudes for concept formation and
reasoning may result from such structural lesions of recursive
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mental TOTE models, as for example evidenced by disturbed
categorical performance on sorting tasks (Nyhus and Barceló,
2009) 3. Finally, deficient decision making and planning for the
long-term future (Damasio and Anderson, 2003) may constitute
another corollary of these structural lesions of recursive mental
TOTE models.
Further, Fuster (2008) proposed in his influential book that
the prefrontal cortex is organized hierarchically, such that con-
trol is supported in progressively rostral regions as decisions are
made at more abstract levels (see also Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre,
2008; Botvinick, 2008). Consistent with the concept of hierar-
chically arrayed levels of control, recent neuroimaging studies
have repeatedly demonstrated differences in functional activation
along the rostro-caudal axis of lateral frontal cortex, ranging from
lateral frontal polar cortex to premotor cortex, such that more
anterior regions were associated with progressively more abstract
action control (Badre et al., 2009, 2010). This body of neurosci-
entific knowledge may be reconciled with the current hypothesis
by the assumption that the hyper-planes of the recursive mental
TOTE models are hierarchically arrayed in the prefrontal cor-
tex, such that progressively rostral regions support progressively
higher levels.
3Eling et al. (2008) trace the otherwise lost history of sorting tasks from the
studies of Ach on the psychology of thinking, via the work of Goldstein and
Gelb on brain lesioned patients around 1920 and subsequent developments,
up to the actual design of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton et al.,
1993) by Harlow, Grant, and Berg back in the 40 s of the twentieth century.
SEQUELAE
There are a number of corollaries of the considerations which I
presented here. First, a reduced output on fluency tasks, impaired
organization and monitoring of material to be remembered,
and of the subject’s own responses, are among the major cog-
nitive deficits after frontal lobe damage (Milner and Petrides,
1984). Neuropsychological assessment of executive function-
ing should in the future more explicitly address the struc-
turing of stimulus materials and behavioral responses in for-
mal examinations, giving the subject sufficient room to think
of the situations they are confronted with, thereby explic-
itly offering them the opportunity to establish mental models
for themselves. An appropriate conceptual as well as psycho-
metric refinement of examination techniques would be most
appreciated. Second, with the progress of those assessment
instruments, new questions for empirical research could be
posed. There is a remarkable paucity of theoretical investigations
into the elements of executive function in the neuropsychological
literature (but see Hazy et al., 2007; Hinz et al., 2009; Bishara et al.,
2010; Shallice and Cooper, 2011). Consequently, experimental
methods and clinical materials suffer from the lack of theoreti-
cal understanding of executive function. Model-based approaches
are needed in future studies of the cognitive neuropsychology
of executive function. Moving beyond traditional disciplinary
boundaries would greatly facilitate the achievement of that goal.
The work presented in this paper should be considered an initial
step in the direction of getting formal with mental models, i.e.,
the cognitive basis of executive function.
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